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Th e general idea of the article is to compare Deleuze’s theory of the institution, which emerges in the 
context of various infl uences of French phenomenology and philosophy of law, with Searle’s theory 
and the latest Anglo-Saxon theories of the institution, and the new institutionalism. Deleuze care-
lessly diff erentiates infl uences and fragments copied or taken over from Hume, Saint-Just, de Sade, 
Renard, Hauriou, Durkheim, Malinowski and others and in the end completely succeeds in relegating 
to oblivion his ingenious project from 1953, Instincts and Institutions (Instincts et institutions). Th e 
consequences of such writing and theoretical work call into question the status of the theory of the 
institution and replace it with intuition and recognition that the thematisation of the institution is an 
impossible task. Th us the author of the article attempts to ‘integrate’ this impossibility to systematically 
think or explain the fi gure of institution into the framework of the great and pioneering work of Saint-
Just, Hume, Deleuze, Gehlen and Searle.
Deleuze’s main contribution to a future imaginary theory of the institution is the concept of 
a revolutionary institution as the result of reversal and sudden turning, the perverting of something, that 
happens within the institution. Deleuze uses l’institution révolutionnaire (revolutionary institution) in 
his texts, certainly completely aware that this phrase has a quite chaotic and vague history during post-
revolutionary periods, but also that it is perfectly in the spirit of Saint-Just’s intentions. Institutions, 
free of laws, linking immobilising and moralising actions. Such pure institutions would be models of 
free actions, anarchic, in perpetual motion, in permanent revolution, in a constant state of immorality.
Revolution is re-institutionalisation (or deinstitutionalisation) which includes diff erent forms 
of violence. Saint-Just detects two phenomena outside of institutions: terror and corruption. Hume 
discovers that violence has an advantage over the contract, and that in one way or another gives 
institutions their dynamic. Th anks to his mixture of these two diff erent registers, Deleuze outlines the 
transformation of violence into institutions: 1. Institutionalisation reveals the violence that precedes 
it and that it interrupts (raw violence or terror), as well as the violence opposed to it (corruption). 
2. Violence is minimised in the process of institutionalisation because it is performed by all or the 
largest possible number of actors. 3. Th e violence of institutionalisation is violence in the process of 
conversion (Balibar), it is subsumed into the coercion of rules, into symbolic or institutional pressure. 
4.  Th e revolutionary institution supposes that there is no violence that has not been turned into 
the “body” of the institution, without remainder, and that therefore there is nothing outside of the 
institution. Refs 19.
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ЖИЛЬ ДЕЛЕЗ ОБ ИНСТИТУЦИИ И НАСИЛИИ
Petar Bojanić
Institute for Philosophy and Social Th eory of the Belgrade’s University,
45, Kraljice Natalije, Beograd, 11000, Srbija
Основная идея статьи заключается в сравнении теории институтов Делеза, которая воз-
никает в  контексте различных влияний французской феноменологии и  философии права, 
с теорией Серла, новейшими англосаксонскими теориями институтов и новым институцио-
нализмом. Делез небрежно дифференцирует влияния и фрагменты, заимствованные из Юма, 
Сен-Жюста, де Сада, Ренара, Ориу, Дюркгейма, Малиновского и  других, и в  конце концов 
полностью предает забвению свой гениальный проект 1953  г., представленный в  «Инстин-
ктах и институциях». Последствиями такого стиля письма и теоретической работы становит-
ся постановка под вопрос статуса теории институтов и замещение последней интуицией или 
осознанием того, что тематизация институции — это невыполнимая задача. Таким образом, 
автор статьи осуществляет попытку «интегрировать» эту невозможность систематического 
осмысления и объяснения фигуры институции в контекст важной и новаторской работы Сен-
Жюста, Юма, Делеза, Гелена и Серла.
Главным вкладом Делеза в будущую воображаемую теорию институтов является понятие 
революционной институции как результата внезапного поворота, искажения, случившегося 
внутри институции. Конечно, Делез в своих текстах использует выражение «революционная 
институция» (l’institution révolutionnaire) безотносительно к истории его довольно хаотического 
и расплывчатого употребления в постреволюционные эпохи, однако он делает это совершен-
но в духе намерений Сен-Жюста. Революция порождает институции, свободные от законов, 
которые связывают и обездвиживают действия посредством их морализации. Такие чистые 
институции могут стать моделями свободных действий, анархических, находящихся в непре-
станном движении, перманентном преобразовании, постоянном состоянии имморальности. 
Революция — это реинституализация (или деинституализация), включающая различные 
формы насилия. Сен-Жюст обнаруживает два явления за пределами институций  — террор 
и  коррупцию. Юм доказывает, что насилие имеет преимущество над договором, поскольку 
в  той или иной мере сообщает институтам динамику существования. Благодаря смешению 
двух этих различающихся регистров Делез демонстрирует трансформацию насилия в револю-
ционных институциях. 1. Институализация обнаруживает жестокость или террор как пред-
шествующее ей насилие, которое она прерывает; так же как и насилие, которое этому процессу 
противостоит (коррупция). 2. В процессе институционализации насилие сводится к миниму-
му, потому что выполняется всеми или как можно большим числом участников. 3. Насилие 
институционализации — это насилие в процессе преобразования (Балибар), оно замещается 
принуждением правил, символическим или институциональным давлением. 4. Революцион-
ная институция предполагает, что нет никакого насилия, которое не было бы превращено 
в «тело» учреждения, без остатка, и поэтому нет ничего за пределами институции. Библиогр. 
19 назв.
Ключевые слова: теория институтов, революция, революционный институт (l’institution ré-
volutionnaire), насилие, Ж. Делез. 
“Formons la cité!” (Create the City!) [1, p, 1138]
Th e institution and/or the fi gure of the ‘institution’ — already in Deleuze’s careless-
ness in diff erentiating the singular and plural of this word, as well as in the introduction 
of the fi gure of a ‘fi gure’ (“L’institution, <…> est un système préfi guré;” “L’institution, c’est 
le fi guré” [2, p. 37, 39]1) — are, without doubt, that which is positive. Th ere is not a sin-
gle place where Deleuze treats the institution as an obstacle, as something ‘petrifi ed’ and 
1 Th is “fi guré” is translated into English as “the fi gure” (“Th e institution is the fi gure”). G. Deleuze, 
Empiricism and Subjectivity, tr. C. V. Boundas, New York, Columbia University Press, 1991, p. 49. [2a]. Th e 
institution is the fi gurative, not literal, or the institution marks the fi gurative (that which exist fi gures in a 
diff erent place and becomes something else, something transformed). Th is fi guring elsewhere represents 
institutionalisation, while the institution is the completion of this process.
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‘dead,’ and where he calls for the reconstruction, resistance, struggle and tearing down of 
institutions. Even in the Anti-Oedipus from 1972/3, in which he develops in detail the 
models of thinking the institution and institutional analysis, completely transforming the 
‘theory’ of the institution from his fi rst texts (more accurately, fi rst fragments), Deleuze 
says that the great socialist utopias of the 19th century function as “désinvestissement ou 
une “désinstitution” du champ social actuel,” precisely to the benefi t of a revolutionary in-
stitution of desire itself (au profi t d’une institution révolutionnaire du désir lui-même) [3, 
p. 38]. Twenty years earlier, while analyzing Hume and ‘l’institution du gouvernement,’ 
Deleuze was actually speaking about the correction of sovereignty, the right to resistance, 
and the legitimacy of revolution (une légitimité de la révolution) [1, p. 42]; but even then 
was the new and ideal institution the only goal. Institutions which ‘deinstitutionalize’ are 
not really institutions because they are determined by order and law (les institutions légales 
et légalisés) [Ibid. P. 74]. Th at which is institutional ought to probably be that which is 
revolutionary. Conversely, it seems that the revolutionary should not be found anywhere 
outside of the institution or the revolution is, in one way of another, la révolution institu-
tionnelle (the revolutionary institution).
Firstly, we are interested in the preference Deleuze has for the phrase l’institution ré-
volutionnaire (revolutionary institution), as opposed to the less original la révolution insti-
tutionnelle (institutional revolution) [4, p. 80]. Deleuze uses l’institution révolutionnaire in 
his texts, certainly completely aware that this phrase has a quite chaotic and vague history 
during post-revolutionary periods, but also that it is perfectly in the spirit of Saint-Just’s 
intentions. We should investigate whether this phrase best describes Deleuze’s imaginary 
theory of the institution, as well as his engagement with the theory more generally. A 
much more serious task would consist of comparing Deleuze’s theory of the institution, 
which emerges in the context of various infl uences of French phenomenology and phi-
losophy of law, with Searle’s theory and the latest Anglo-Saxon theories of the institution, 
and the new institutionalism. Th e preliminary diffi  culty, which immediately questions 
and devalues our commentary, is Deleuze’s own refusal to thematise the institution and 
his own eff ort, and thus actually answer his own questions from the 1950s: what is it that 
explains the institution (ce qui explique l’institution) [1, p. 38] and “quelles doivent être 
les institutions parfaites, c’est-à-dire celles qui s’opposent à tout contrat, et qui ne supposent 
qu’un minimum de lois” (what should perfect institutions be like, that is, ones opposed to 
all agreement, and which suppose a minimum of laws? [4, p. 80]). Instead of exact answers 
or detailed explanations of his own inspirational or suggestive responses (for example, 
“Les lois lient les actions; elles les immobilisent, et les moralisent. De pures institutions sans 
lois seraient par nature des modèles d’actions libres, anarchiques, en mouvement perpétuel, 
en révolution permanente, en état d’immoralité constante” (Laws link actions; they immo-
bilise and moralise them. Pure institutions, free of laws, would be models of free actions, 
anarchic, in perpetual motion, in permanent revolution, in a constant state of immorality) 
[Ibid. p. 79]), Deleuze writes too quickly and carelessly diff erentiates infl uences and frag-
ments copied or taken over from Hume, Saint-Just, de Sade, Renard, Hauriou, Durkheim, 
Malinowski and others. In the end he completely succeeds in relegating to oblivion his 
ingenious project from 1953, Instincts et institutions (Instincts and Institutions) [5]. Of 
course the consequences of such writing and theoretical work call into question the status 
of theory within the framework of institutions and within the actions of revolutionary 
changes to institutions raising such questions as: who changes institutions, who purifi es 
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and who sullies them, and, who, if anyone, is the subject of institutionalisation (or deinsti-
tutionalisation?). Also — and this precisely is our problem — Deleuze’s carelessness and 
eff ectively his abandonment of his own early attempt at conceptualising the institution, 
could possibly mark his intuition and recognition that the thematisation of the institu-
tion is, as of yet, an impossible task. Aft er all, did John Searle not show recently that the 
theory of institutions has not yet been built and that its development is still in its infancy? 
[6, p. 22]2.
Still, let us attempt to ‘integrate’ this impossibility to systematically think or explain 
the institution — the reason for this certainly concerns some ‘institutional’ or perhaps 
‘un-institutional’ (extra- or anti-institutional) resistance  — into the framework of the 
great and pioneering work of Saint-Just, Hume, Deleuze, Gehlen and Searle. Let us 
assume, along with Saint-Just, that leaving out systematic thinking about institutions 
would mean, fi rst of all, the impossibility of founding a republic and building revolu-
tionary institutions. If we wanted to fi nd Gilles Deleuze’s main contribution to a fu-
ture imaginary theory of the institution and starting with his forceful use of the phrase 
l’institution révolutionnaire, within which are built the eff orts of Hume, Saint-Just or 
de Sade, then it is his insistence that there is a kind of reversal and sudden turning, 
the perverting of something, carried out by the institution or that happens within the 
institution or that can be called institutionalisation. Th is can be labeled as revolution-
ary. Th e pure institution or a permanently revolutionary institution  — new concepts 
left  to us by Deleuze  — abolish, for example, corruption within the republic3 or they 
reappropriate non-institutionalised spaces within the republic or transform, or force 
the transformation of anything which is limited or in some way particular4. Opposed 
to that, the impotence of systematic thinking or the impotence of institutionalisation 
(this is the process that ‘institutionalises’ that which confronts it or resists it) paradoxi-
cally shows that we are still in a truly pre-revolutionary and therefore pre-institutional 
time, in which Saint-Just himself lived. Our eternal contemporary, Saint-Just detects 
two phenomena or two entities outside of institutions, and which only the (revolution-
ary) institution can realise: terror and corruption. In fact, we can confi rm that these 
two forms of violence (let us be on guard about the as of yet completely uncharted re-
lation between corruption and violence) still today oppose the institution and repre-
sent its main temptation. It seems that it was Deleuze who had already discovered in 
Hume — although this too is never fully thematised — the great beginning of the story of 
violence as the source and origin of the institution and order. Well before Hegel and En-
gels, and much later Benjamin (Balibar has recently published a long text about violence 
which gives important explanations of the process of ‘conversion’ and ‘un-conversion’ 
2 Hugh Heclo showed this problem analysing twenty-one defi nitions of the institutions (in fact there 
are many more) which are currently used. Cf. [7, p. 48–51]. 
3 “La terreur peut nous débarrasser de la monarchie et de l’aristocratie; mais qui nous délivrera de la 
corruption? Des institutions. On ne s’en doute pas; on croit avoir tout fait quand on a une machine à gou-
vernement…” (Terror can rid us of the monarchy and the aristocracy; but who will save us from corruption? 
Institutions. Regarding that, there is no doubt; we think we have done everything when we have a governing 
machine…”) [5, p. 35; 1, p. 1135]. 
4 Deleuze’s engagement is diff erent from Merleau-Ponty’s and his reconstruction of Husserl’s Stift ung 
and reinstutionalisation. For Merleau-Ponty the revolution is something already set in the fondation, in the 
fi rst violence. Th e revolution is “réinstitution, aboutissant à renversement d’institution précédente” (the rein-
stituionalisation, the achievement of the overturn of the previous institution). Cf., [8, p. 42].
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of violence into an institution [9, p. 48, 66, etc.]), Hume discovers that violence has an
advantage over the contract, and that in one way or another gives institutions their dy-
namic.
Deleuze’s Hume and Deleuze’s Saint-Just
It is entirely possible to reconstruct Deleuze’s eff ort, and at the same time his diffi  culty 
in explaining his intention, based on the sixty-six fragments from his collection Instincts 
et institutions5. His “Introduction”6 to the collection, and a few pages and fragments he 
wrote or delivered during his life (known to us thus far), allow only the recognition of the 
advantage Deleuze gives certain authors: to his fi rst book, Deleuze contributes two frag-
ments from Hume, which he will then analyse elsewhere, and the famous paragraphs by 
Saint-Just about “institutions, moeurs et loi” (institutions, mores and law); further, a few 
fragments about institutions and organisation (Buytendijk, Halbwachs); from Hauriou 
Deleuze will take the diff erentiation between institution and personifi cation, from Renard 
the diff erence between contrat and institution (contract and institution), which he will 
then wrongly attribute to Hume, from Levi-Strauss and Frazer he will take the relation-
ship between instinct and tendance (tendency) on the one hand and institution on the 
other, and from Durkheim he will learn that enforcement is the main characteristic of the 
institution, from Malinowski, again, Deleuze takes the link between the institution and 
the means, between charte (charter) and institution, [5, p. 4–5]7 etc.). It is also possible to 
show some oversights and dilemmas, that is show what he had not done and what remains 
to be done. For example, it is necessary to come back to that place in the Introduction 
where Deleuze asks about the institution of the state, to which no tendency corresponds 
(“auxquelles ne correspond nulle tendance”). What at all does the state as an institution 
satisfy in us? Or what is the position of the state in the order of institutions (for Searle, the 
state is the ultimate institutional structure, while Renard recognises a federal state which 
he terms l’institution des institutions)? We ought always to reread that sudden conclusion 
of Deleuze’s in Empirisme et subjectivité, or rather the page that follows “ce qui explique 
5 Deleuze collected portions of various texts about institution and intuition. Th e book contains writ-
ings by Malinowski, Alain, Hume, Levi-Strauss, Kant, Frazer, Freud, Eliade, Plekhanov, Bergson, Goldstein, 
Saint-Just, Renard, Bachofen, Comte, Marx and many others. It appears that Deleuze translated only four 
fragments from English (for example Malinowski and Frazer), while most fragments are taken from already 
existing translations into French. Th e early texts and intentions of Deleuze were written about inspiringly 
by Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc in his doctoral thesis Politique et Clinique [Political and Clinical], defended in 
2006 (p. 48–74, etc.).
6 Th e short Introduction (p. viii-xi) was republished in the magazine Philosophie (N 65, 2000, p. 23–26) 
and in the book L’île déserte [Desert Island] (1953–1974) [10, p. 25–27].
7 Th e sentence “L’institution se présente toujours comme un système organisé de moyens” from Deleuze’s 
introduction is in fact a sentence from Malinowski, “Th e institution as the organised means of realising the 
values…”, which Deleuze did not translate [11, p. 157]. Th e two fragments of Malinowski found at the very 
beginning of Deleuze’s book explain the socio-psychological moment in Deleuze’s explanations of the insti-
tution. Social institutions exist to ‘answer’ or to ‘meet’ psychological needs, and every institution possesses 
personnel, a charter, a set of norms, activities, apparatus, functions, etc. Deleuze later uses the term ‘charter’ (a 
term Deleuze could have also found in Renard’s book La philosophie de l’institution from 1939), which gives 
universality of structure to an institution, in a book dedicated to Foucault: “Une institution comporte elle-
même des énoncés, par exemple une constitution, une charte, des contrats, des inscriptions et enregistrements” 
(An institution includes its own utterances, for example a constitution, a charter, agreements, inscriptions 
and records) [12, p. 19]. 
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l’institution, ce n’est pas la tendance, mais la réfl ection de la tendance dans l’imagination” 
(the institution is not explained by the tendency, but by the refl ection of the tendency 
in the imagination) [1, p. 38]. Where does imagination come from? Still, it seems most 
important for us now, as was mentioned, to construct a modest theory about Deleuze’s 
interruption of work on the theory of the institution in order to, in any sense, explain his 
discovery or sketch of a ‘new’ interpretation of the institution. Of course, this ‘interrup-
tion’ means that Deleuze, without huge complications, is able to transfer and make use of 
his early research in his later ‘theories of institutional analysis,’ and, we are assuming, that 
Deleuze is able to somehow grasp what ‘the essence’ of the institution is, while at the same 
time show the diffi  culties and limits of the thematisation of the institution. Th e results of 
his eff orts surrounding the institution from the fi ft ies, then, can be found ‘in eff ect’ later, 
primarily in his work in the eighties. We mean above all the model of argumentation, or 
the way of advancement of thought or succession of terms in Deleuze, which we could 
label as ‘institutionalisation’ or ‘reversal’ (renversement). Deleuze could have found the 
origin of this method in those sixty-six fragments about the institution or, more precisely, 
thanks to a mixture of infl uences of Hume and Saint-Just, but also through conscious or 
unconscious opposition to all classical forms of dialectic and Hobbes’ understanding of 
the institution. Th e lack of Hobbes in Deleuze’s choice of fragments means the rejection 
of a specifi c model of the use of the verb ‘to institute,’ which Hume himself neglects and 
relegates to a secondary importance. In Hobbes, ‘to institute’ means to decide, to begin 
something with determination. It is the decisive subjective act of starting something (out 
of nothing), which is actually opposite (but analogous) to the creation of nature and is 
an act committed by Hobbes’ active subject8. Th e uncertainty of the subject, but also the 
sudden appearance of the object of institutionalisation (institué) (is this a way to explain 
the importance of Hume for Deleuze and us all?) is achieved based on at least three simul-
taneous and complementary operations. Neglecting the sovereign act of the founding of 
a social form is conducted through the appearance of a contract (between some two, or 
two sides that come to an agreement as opposed to a single, sovereign decision), then by 
the introduction of multiple subjects or a group (a collective) whose members together 
‘accomplish’ the process of institutionalisation or for example, ‘legalisation’ of their own 
property, and fi nally, the discovery that the decision or institutionalisation is neither per-
fect nor complete. Why institutionalisation or the institution is not perfect and hence not 
sovereign, is shown by Hume explicitly in two places which Deleuze knows very well, 
but never analyses. Here are the quotes now, in English, immediately pointing to the im-
portant problem of translation or reversal of ‘the institution’ from Latin or English into 
French or our own language:
Time and custom give authority to all forms of government, and all successions of princ-
es; and that power, which at fi rst was founded only on injustice and violence, becomes in time 
legal and obligatory [16]9.
8 Hobbes’ use of ‘to institute’ harkens back to medieval meaning of the term ‘institutio’ (an order or 
command). It is interesting that Pufendorf in De iure naturali et gentium uses the word impositionis (imposi-
tion) in this sense, which the French translator, Barbeyrac translates as l’institution. Since he cannot fi nd an 
equivalent in French for imposition, he is forced to defend his solution. “<…> we use institution most oft en 
for that which is invented and established, as opposed to coming from nature. <…> our author (Pufendorf) 
wants to say when he posits that in fact moral things are such by imposition, and not in themselves or by 
nature.” Cf. [14, p. 175–176].
9 Cf. [16, book III, part 2, 10 “Of the objects of allegiance”].
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Time, by degrees, removes all these diffi  culties, and accustoms the nation to regard, as 
their lawful or native princes, that family, which, at fi rst, they considered as usurpers or 
foreign conquerors. In order to found this opinion, they have no recourse to any notion of 
voluntary consent or promise, which, they know, never was, in this case, either expected or 
demanded. Th e original establishment was formed by violence, and submitted to from ne-
cessity. Th e subsequent administration is also supported by power, and acquiesced in by the 
people, not as a matter of choice, but of obligation10.
Probably no one prior to Hume says, and repeats, so clearly that violence (‘violence and 
injustice’) is at the beginning, and that for Hobbes ‘to institute’ or for Hume ‘to establish’ are 
concepts and terms completely imbued with violence. However trivial this demystifi cation 
of the ‘sovereign’ and ‘institutional act’ seems today, Hume would forever change the accent 
from the institution as such or the sovereign who founds the institution, to the process itself 
of institutionalisation (a verb) and the object (that which is being institutionalised, institué, 
and then that which can be institutionalised). Of course, Hume’s intervention would be a 
preamble to any further, no less important, fi nesse and nuance in conceptualising the insti-
tution: various theories of ‘counter-institutions,’ which can be followed from Saint-Simon 
(Hume’s contemporary) to Durkheim and Derrida; complex theories about the existence 
of institutions (and customs) not established by norms or the theory of the origin of social 
institutions in conditions in which there is no common will for their establishment (for 
example, the institutions of money, language, the market, law, etc.) (Carl Menger).
What is it then, that Hume does? How was the perspective or the accent changed 
from ‘the institution’ to ‘the institutionalised’ (institué)? How does Deleuze read Hume, 
and then how does he combine this question with, above all, Saint-Just? Th e answer to 
these questions should show the justifi cation of our insistence that Deleuze uses and trans-
forms Hume’s intervention or discovery of the drama of ‘institutionalisation’ (whereby 
something forcibly changes from one thing to another), into the main mode of execution 
of his argument and his analysis. In other words, it should become clear how Deleuze’s 
gerund from the Introduction, where institutions “transforment la tendance elle-mêmes 
en introduisant dans un milieu nouveau” [5, p. 24] (themselves transform the tendency 
by introducing it to a new context), and force and oppress11 at the same time that they 
satisfy (a desire), turns into the passive voice (“l’espace institué par l’appareil d’Etat” (space 
instituted by the state apparatus) [3, p. 592]), and then into practice, into the discovery 
of a substantive derived from the verb ‘to institute’ — institutionalisation, statifi cation. 
Deleuze formulates all this in the following way:
Les institutions ne sont pas des sources ou des essences, et elles n’ont ni essence ni inté-
riorité. Ce sont des pratiques, des mécanismes opératoires qui n’expliquent pas le pouvoir, 
puisqu’elles en supposent les rapports et se contentent de les „fi xer“, sous une fonction repro-
ductrice et non productrice. Il n’y a pas d’Etat, mais seulement une étatisation, et de même 
pour les autres cas [12, p. 82].
(Institutions are not sources or essences, and they have neither essences nor interiori-
ties. Th ey are practices, operating mechanisms that do not explain power, because they 
assume these relations and content themselves with ‘affi  xing’ them, as part of their func-
tion to reproduce and to produce. Th ere is no State, but only a statifi cation, and the same 
as in all other cases).
10 Cf. [17]. 
11 Cf. [2, p. 37].
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Even though Deleuze’s and Foucault’s common insights into institutions incorporate 
Saint-Just’s and de Sade’s visions of new, future institutions12, in which dominates “un 
modèle dynamique d’action, de pouvoir et de puissance” (a dynamic model of action, power 
and force) [4, p. 78], they could not exist without Hume. Hume, but also Saint-Just, both 
constructs the institution as big, common action that unfolds in an unfi nished time. Th e 
instance of time is precisely the key diff erence between the institution and a contract, 
about which Deleuze writes inspiringly in a book in which he does not at all mention 
Hume. 
On connâit la distinction juridique entre le contrat et l’institution: celui-là en principe 
suppose la volonté des contractants, défi nit entre eux un système de droits et de devoirs, n’est 
pas opposable aux tiers et vaut pour une durée limitée; celle-ci tend à défi nir un statut de 
longue durée, involontaire et incessible, constitutif d’un pouvoir, d’une puissance, dont l’eff et 
est opposable aux tiers [Ibid]13.
(We are aware of the legal diff erence between a contract and the institution: the fi rst 
in principle assumes the willing participation of the parties, defi ned between them as a 
system of rights and obligations, not opposable to a third party, and lasts a defi nite dura-
tion; the latter tends to defi ne position in the long term, involuntary and inaccessible, 
constituted by power, a force, and refers to other parties).
A multitude makes institutions or the people makes an institution (l’institution des 
peuples [1, p. 1091]), and this work happens before everyone’s eyes, as a public thing, con-
cerning everyone, like the republic. In both fragments quoted here, Hume shows that time, 
before the eyes of a multitude, gradually hides (or reveals) what is at the root of power and 
establishments. Over time, again gradually, the process of institutionalisation occurs and 
the reversal of violence and injustice into stable forms takes place; forms which bind not 
only those who participate in the original violence and injustice, but also all those who will 
in due course become members of a given community (‘other parties,’ tiers). Hume thus 
recognises two processes: fi rstly, the silhouette of violence and injustice within the power 
of institutions, underneath the institutions, that is the former process of ‘founding’ (was 
founded only on injustice and violence) and ‘forming’ (was formed by violence), but also at 
the same time, claims that several factors will contribute to the fading of this silhouette, and 
its eventual ‘institutionalisation.’ And although it seems that the key factors in the realisa-
tion of this second process are time (its passage) and the common engagement of the mul-
titude — there is no institution without the pressed, controlled, obligated, forced, bound14, 
etc. — it is necessary to add that the process of ‘institutionalisation’ is a priori expansive, 
and never partial. Meaning, everyone must be engaged, and every form of violence abol-
ished. Th ere is nothing that is outside of the institution. For violence that destroys parts of 
12 Cf. [18, p. 353–354]. “Trois principaux moyens de codage: la loi, le codage et l’institution. <…>Et puis 
il y a une troisième sorte de livres, le livre politique, de préférence révolutionnaire, qui se présente comme un 
livre d’institutions, soit d’institutions présentes, soit d’institutions à venir”. (Th ree principal means of coding: 
law, coding and the institution. <…> And then there is a third kind of book, the political, preferred by revo-
lutionaries, which presents itself as a book of institutions, whether present or future).
13 Th is slightly changed interpretation of Renard’s diff erence between the institution and the contract 
is ‘pressed’ by Deleuze’s early and late attempts to construct an implicitly Humean diff erentiation between 
contract and institution. Cf. [2, p. 35–37; 19, p. 232]. 
14 “Si un homme n’a point d’amis, il est banni;” (If a man has no friends, he is banished). “Celui qui dit 
qu’il ne croit pas à l’amitié est banni;” (He who says that he does not believe in friendship is banished). “Si un 
homme commet un crime, ses amis sont bannis.” (If a man commits a crime, his friends are banished) [Ibid., 
p. 1102–1103]. 
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the community and forcibly occupies objects and territory, for violence that comes from 
simple egoism and limitation to stop, Hume thinks that it is necessary to stabilise the given 
establishment together, and that the result of this process will be power, i.e. the institution 
as manifestation of power. Two words, establishment and institution, that Hume diff erenti-
ates, a diff erence that Deleuze or French translators do not detect, could explain, paradoxi-
cally, everything we owe to Saint-Just15. Terror and corruption, the two ‘forms’ of violence 
that are outside the institution, or have yet to be institutionalised, according to Saint-Just, 
are in the exact place of these analyses of Hume’s, and in place of prepositions under (es-
tablishment) and outside (institution). When institutions become damaged or perverted 
(pervert)16, when people and human nature sully them, when they become occupied by 
perversion (another word Hume uses) and corruption, it is then possible to recognise that 
at the origin of these establishments lies that same violence (killing, robbing, etc.) or terror. 
Violence and terror become visible elements of order and the institution (for example, the 
institution of property, which greatly interests Hume — Deleuze fi rst of all carefully reads 
and analyzes Hume’s analyses of property and obedience from A Treatise of Human Nature 
and from An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals) when they seem insuffi  cient to 
prevent the opposition to the process of institutionalization (reversal or revolution).
Of reversal (renversement)
Let us assume that the ‘deformation’ or ‘perversion’ of which Hume speaks, and for 
which people or a corruptible human nature are responsible, is what marks the failure of 
reversal and a misguided revolution. Th ere is no revolutionary institution because not 
everyone is engaged in a process of grouping or cooperation, there are still those who 
are passive, who are in the way, to whom Saint-Just oft en calls and seriously explains the 
importance of their engagement. Th e idea that someone is missing, and is beyond the con-
trol and pressure of the group, the idea that there is no group or collective (institutional) 
responsibility, is truly an important condition for violence to forever be institutionalized, 
that is to be erased and transformed into something else. Th is dynamic process that pre-
sumes that there is no exception, no special case (no state of emergency), and that all work 
together and are in toto engaged in the creation and formation of the city, suits Hume’s and 
Saint-Just’s use of the word institution. When Hume uses two diff erent words, institution 
and establishment, which imply that the violence has stopped his intention, may have been 
to construct two diff erent moments or steps in the undertaking of legalization of owner-
ship acquired by way of violence. Th e fi rst step, Hume calls it establishment — implies 
the building of power (the change of force or violence into power) through stabilising 
the given state immediately aft er the various crimes took place. Th is step, simultaneously 
the birth of ‘the institution of property’ (this is Hume’s term) or in another context, ‘the 
institution of social property,’ becomes binding for all social actors. Th e factor of time, 
especially emphasised by Hume, refers to the gradual broadening of the process of insti-
15 In the most important place where he thematizes the institution in Empirisme et subjectivité, 
Deleuze fi rst drops an important portion of the section from Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning the Principles 
of Morals, and then quotes Hume from Th e Treatise of Human Nature (page 620 in the French translation): 
“Bien que l’institution de la règle sur la stabilité de la possession soit non seulement utile…” (p. 37), while the 
original reads: “Th o’ the establishment of the rule…”
16 Cf. [16, book III, part 2, 9 “Of the measures of allegiance”].
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tutionalisation to all, the inclusion and binding of all. Let us look at how Saint-Just and 
Deleuze understand this process and how they formulate it:
Il faut substituer, par les institutions, la force et la justice infl exible des lois à l’infl uence 
personnelle. Alors la révolution est aff ermie: il n’y a plus de jalousies, ni de factions: il n’y a 
plus de prétentions ni de calomnies. 
Les institutions ont pour objet d’établir de fait toutes les garanties sociales et indivi-
duelles, pour éviter les dissensions et les violences; de substituer l’ascendant des mœurs à 
l’ascendant des hommes [1, 1091].
(Institutions ought to substitute power and infl exible justice of laws subject to 
personal infl uence. Only then is the revolution consolidated: there are no more jealousies 
or factions, nor pretensions or libel.
Th e goal of institutions is to establish in fact all social and individual guarantees to avoid 
dissent and violence; to substitute the ascendancy of traditions with the ascendancy of man).
Institutions ought to stand in for, to replace something that precedes them (violence, 
force and diff erent forms that divide people), for the revolution only then to be actualised 
or fully executed. Th e erasure of violence and force through institutions caps the revolution 
and is revolutionary. At the same time, institutions prevent confl ict and violence, which 
are obviously a consequence of an insuffi  ciently actualised ‘replacement.’ Saint-Just 
obviously predicts that this process of replacement of violence with institutions occurs 
within a certain timeframe, and whereby the dynamics and activity within institutions 
can be explained. 
Deleuze uses the same verb as Saint-Just:
Le monde moral affi  rme sa réalité quand la contradiction se dissipe eff ectivement, 
quand la conversation est possible et se substitue à la violence, quand la propriété se substitue 
à l’avidité (…) Etre en société, c’est d’abord substituer la conversation possible à la violence 
[2, p. 27, 29].
(A moral world affi  rms its reality when the contradiction is eff ectively resolved, when 
conversation is possible and takes the place of violence, when property is replaced with 
greed <…> to be in society is fi rst of all to substitute violence for a possible conversation).
In the book about Hume, Deleuze channels Saint-Just. Th anks to his mixture of two 
diff erent registers and two diff erent commentaries, it is clear that Deleuze announces yet 
again (although neither explicitly nor without reserve) ‘the subject’ of institutionalization. 
Th is subject, however, is completely diff erent from that of Hobbes. To be part of society 
or to be together presupposes ‘the substitution’ of violence into revolutionary institutions. 
All we can do now is perhaps only tentatively list the conditions and the framework of this 
task or charge that remains untouched from Saint-Just to Deleuze. It seems that this sketch 
of turning violence into institutions could only be successful if it could position exactly the 
diff erent forms of violence within this revolutionary theatre:
a) Th e substitution is violent or the institutionalisation is violent if it does not only 
consist of one act that births or founds a new order or establishment, but rather of many 
permanent actions and acts that become more complicated over time. Institutionalisation 
reveals the violence that precedes it and which it interrupts (raw violence or terror), and 
violence which is opposed to it (corruption).
b) Th ree violences that are diff erent in form and strength determine the number of 
actors who perform it. Violence is minimised in the process of institutionalisation because 
it is performed by all or the largest possible number of actors.
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c) Violence of institutionalisation is violence in the process of conversion (Balibar). 
Violence of founding (fondation) and violence of terror is transformed (translated, trans-
posed, reversed, substituted) into the coercion of rules, into the symbolic or institutional 
coercion or pressure.
d) Th e revolutionary institution supposes that there is no violence that has not been 
turned into the ‘body’ of the institution, without remainder, and that therefore there is 
nothing outside of the institution.
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